In discussion of the social issues associated with autonomous weapons, I turn to a treatment of such in terms of strategic, or military, culture. Strategic culture is defined as “shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written) that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives” (Kartchner, 2009). In other words, strategic culture concerns the identity, values, norms, and perceptions that affect the functioning of a given security apparatus.
American innovation has been responsible for breakthroughs in abstract communication media such as the internet and allied social networking technology. These communication technologies are a part of the status quo American identity. These technologies ‘close the gap’ of communication by enabling virtual correspondence with many, anytime. Ironically, utilization of these remote communication technologies can make for a disconnection in personal communication in terms of more time calling, texting, Facebooking, or e-mailing and often less actual face time. This component of American identity is reflected in military technology. For instance, today, at least one-third of all aerial, sea, and land-based military vehicles are unmanned, albeit still controlled from a remote location by a human operator. So while technology enables the military to ‘close the gap’ – to be anywhere in the world in a moment - this same technology can also cultivate a sense of disconnectedness from the reality on the ground. The cultural identity of America, with its emphasis on remote command, control, and communications, feeds the development of autonomous weapons technologies. Likewise, the utilization of such technologies reinforces this component of sociocultural identity.America values a specific type of instrumental rationality; one based upon cost benefit analyses. Not everybody formulates rationality in this same way, nor is it strictly American. In the United States, the common way of evaluating war is on this scale of cost benefit analysis. There is also a strong sense of ‘duty’. As far as the US is committed to compliance with the Geneva Conventions and the principals of Just War Doctrine, military culture is concerned with proportionality (i.e. the rewards must outweigh the risks) and discrimination (i.e. between combatants and non-combatants). The verdict on whether or not an event or mode of action fits within this framework of valuation often determines the extent of socioeconomic resources committed to the cause. Turning to the US development and utilization of autonomous weapons, the extent of development and utilization presumably depends upon whether or not autonomous technology can demonstrate a reliable level of discriminatory intelligence, enough to satisfice concerns over proportionality and discrimination. This is the materialistic level of evaluation, which is supplemented with concerns about whether or not it is ‘worth it’ to advance autonomous systems for warfighting purposes. Such worthiness is a function of risk versus reward.
Risk perception also affects disposition to use or non-use of autonomous weapons. One who sees a threat around every corner is more likely to justify an aggressive posture than one who feels a relative sense of safety. In the United States, the gravity of the ‘terrorist threat’ motivates the magnitude of compromise willing to be made for the sake of security. In a time of less readily perceivable war, risky venture support is marginalized. This dynamic can affect autonomous weapons in two ways: first, it could be seen that autonomous weapons are too risky because of concerns in terms of discrimination, proportionality, and the threat of proliferation of such weapons systems at the hands of adversaries. On the other hand, it could also be seen that autonomous weapons limit the risk of human life by virtue of their characteristic ‘remote control’ function. Opponents will use the former argument, and advocates will use the latter. To flip the script, the actual use of autonomous weapons affects risk perception in a paradoxical way: friendly human life is valuable to the extent that it is desirable to minimize risk of human life through employment of autonomous systems, and enemy life is expendable to the extent that robotic technology can execute the kill.
Whether or not it is acceptable and ‘normal’ to develop autonomous weapons is a judgment created out of a combination of identity, values, and risk perception. The ultimate establishment of such norms is reflected in public policy, such as arms control. Resonance or dissonance with established norms is predictable according to an analysis of the strategic culture of the entity in question. For instance, whether or not China will chill with development of autonomous weapons, or push full speed ahead, depends upon its sociocultural environment. Likewise, once recommended rules and regulations are formalized in public policy, compliance or non-compliance will affect, and be affected by, culture.
Robert K. Gifford observes that the experience of warfighting is directly related to the technology one employs (Robert K. Gifford, “Psychological Aspects of Combat” in Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Vol. 1: Military Performance, ed. by Thomas W. Britt, Carl Andrew Castro, and Amy B. Adler (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 16). Throughout the history of war, technology served to augment warfighting functions. This augmentation occurred because the warfighter represented an instrument just as much as the weapon(s) he or she employs. However, this dynamic might be changing from an augmentation role towards a substitution role. If this change does indeed occur, then the fundamental character of war might change as well. A noticeable fundamental change is the elimination of risks associated with warfighting.
ReplyDeleteIt appears that autonomous weapons represent the attraction by strategists with riskless warfighting. An example of this appearance is the reliance on unmanned and stand-off platforms, which reduce the risk to warfighters. P.W. Singer observes that geographical limitations are no longer a factor of a soldier’s experience in relation to the use of autonomous weapons technology (P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2009), 329-330.) This type of warfare seems attractive in the sense that one does not need to risk their own warfighters to conduct military actions and achieve objectives.
Not directly facing one’s enemy is not a new occurrence. For example, artillery and aerial weapons typically require the separation of combatants. However, these warfighters still experience the hazards of war due to mission requirements. The autonomous weapon operator, particularly the UAV operator, presents a more clear-cut example of alienation from the fighting. The UAV operator does not ship off to a foxhole in a combat zone rather commutes daily to a cubicle with a computer screen, as Singer claims (P.W. Singer, 329.) This alienation from fighting changes the nature of warfighting. Christopher Coker argues that “No longer are human beings the measure of war” rather it is machines and technology (Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors?: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, 172). This notion directly challenges the warrior ethos as demonstrated in the following assertion by Clive Thompson: “unless you are actually risking your life in battle, it is not real (Clive Thompson, “The Making of an X Box Warrior,” The New York Times (Aug. 22, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/22/magazine/22GAMES.html?pagewanted=6).”
An attraction with riskless warfighting practices might prove fatal. Paul W. Kahn argues that riskless war advances a moral dilemma because warfighting is perceived as a “confrontation of mechanical means, in which combatants rarely see directly the targets of their actions (Paul W. Kahn, “War and Sacrifice in Kosovo,” Philosophy and Public Policy 19 (Spring/Summer 1999)).” As a result, alienation from the hazards of war could increase a disregard for humanitarian norms developed over centuries of warfare in the ethos of warfighters (Ibid). More importantly, war could become “too easy politically (Ibid). Therefore, it is crucial to determine whether autonomous weapons are augmenting or substituting the warfighter. If autonomous weapons substitute warfighters, then not only could the fundamental character of war change, but the fundamental purpose of war (particular mean(s) to a particular political end(s)) might change as well.
Matthew Harris